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In the Supren1e Court of the 
State of Utah 
THE VALLEY MORTUARY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LIONEL FAIRBANKS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 7350 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment 
of the DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT after refusal to grant a jury upon due demand,"~ 
holding that a contract between the parties precluded the 
defendant from performing funeral services in a specified 
territory, awarding damages for past alleged breaches and 
enjoining the defendant from performing services in said 
territory in the future. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Under date of August 6, 1945, Lionel Fairbanks, de-
fendant and appellant, doing business as Lionel Fairbanks 
Mortuary, entered into an agreement with Aura C. Hatch, 
acting for and on behalf of the Valley Mortuary, plaintiff 
and respondent herein. This agreement was subsequently 
modified as to paragraph five (5) thereof so that the agree-
ment after its modification reads as follows (plaintiff's Ex-
hibit "A") : 
"AGREEMENT 
This agreement made this 6th day of August, 1945, 
by and between Lionel Fairbanks Mortuary of Eureka, 
Utah, and · the V!alley Mortuary a Corpn. of Utah 
County with main office at Provo, Utah. 
Now, Therefore, the seller Lionel Fairbanks agrees 
to furnish the Valley Mortuary buyer, with a Warran-
ty deed for the Mortu~ry property in Eureka, with ab-
stract brought up to date to the satisfaction of the 
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork. 
2. To furnish the buyer with a certificate of title, free 
and clear, to t}?.e Buick Hearse mentioner in the inven-
tory. 
3. To furnish the buyer with a BILL o~F SAUE to the 
mortuary equipement, caskets, supplies, and personal 
property set forth in the attached inventory. 
4. To deliver to the buyer possession of the premises 
herein referred to, together with all the equipment, 
fixtures, etc. as set out immediately on the signing of 
this agreernent. 
5. That the said sellar will not for a period of (25) 
twenty five years, from the date of this contract, op-
erate a mortuary or funeral business in Utah Co. Pro-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
vo & South of Provo or Juab Counties, in his own name 
or through a subsidiary or third party. 
6. The sellor agrees that all bills, accounts, and ob-
ligations and taxes incurred prior to August 6, 1945, 
shall be paid by him. 
jsj Lionel Fairbanks 
LIONEL FAIRBANKS MO·RTUARY 
jsj Aura C. Hatch 
PRES. VALLEY MORTUARY" 
Exhibit "A" also includes the inventory attached to the 
contract, which itemized the following property, which was 
to be conveyed under the agreement: 
''IN·VENTORY AT THE FAIRBANKS MORTUARY, 
EUREKA, UTAH 
As of August 6th, 1945 
CASKETS 
1 State (Pink). 
1 " Choc}tlet 
1 " oct. 
1 " Red 
1 " Sil Rivera 
1 " Ore. 
1 " Mohogney P9l 
1 " Corduary Rose 
1 " " Blue 
1 Oct. 
1 Tan 
1 Lamb 
3 2j0 White Lamb. 
5 Rough Boxes 
$95.00 
77.00 
95.00 
95.00 
95.00 
87.50 
187.50 
54.00 
54.00 
65.00 
37.00 
35.00 
23.25 
40.00 
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FURNI'IURE & FIXTURES 
Drapes and Curtains 
Underwood Typewritter 
1 Electric Heater 
1 Uawn Mower 
2 Ash Trays on Stands 
1 Monkey Stove 
1 Heater 
19 Plain Chairs 
1 Mohar Divan 
1 Lether Divan 
8 Other c•hairs 
1 Roletop Desk & Chair 
1 Library Table 
3 9-12 rugs 
· 2 Coffee Tables 
1 Center table 
3 Floor Lamps 
1 . Table Lamp 
1· Hall Tree 
SUPPLIES 
184 Bottles Embalming Fluid. 
2 · Mens Suits 
2 Womens Dresses \ 
1 Womens Slippers 
.1- L D S Garment 
1 Buick Hearse 1935 
· 1 · Ca.sket vail 
1 Frigid Lowering Device 
1 Set Green grave drapes 
1 Metal Emb. Table / 
1 Metal Stre-tcher 
. ·1· . ~xx:xxx:· u· 
1 . · Vigial Lamp 
· , a Crucifix · 
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1 
2 
5 
Set Embalming Inst. 
Make up Kit. 
Church Trucks 
2 Display " 
28 Sheets 
2 Pillow slips" 
On or about the month of September, 1945, Lionel Falr-
banks approached Aura C. Hatch, president and manager 
of the Valley Mortuary, and told Mr. Hatch that Fairbanks 
wanted to build a mortuary or funeral home in Orem or 
American Fork, and Hatch, in his own handwriting, added 
by interlineation in paragraph five (5) of such agreement, 
after the words "mortuary or funeral business in Provo, 
Utah" the words "co. and south of Provo" so that paragraph 
five (5) of the agreement, after the interlineation, is as 
shown above. 
Lionel Fairbanks built a mortuary or funeral home in 
Orem about seven (7) miles north of the north city limits 
of Provo, Utah, (Tr. 16) and began operation thereof on 
December 22, 1946 (Tr. 16). Thereafter Fairbanks picked 
up bodies in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo and 
in Juab County and conducted funerals in these localities, 
particularly in the city of Eureka in Juab County (Tr. 18, 
19, 33). Fairbanks operated only one establishment where 
some funerals were held, and all of the bodies were em-
balmed, and that establishment was in Orem, seven (7) 
miles North of Provo (Tr. 63). 
Almost two (2) years after Fairbanks ·began the oper-
ation of his funeral business in Orem, Valley Mortuary in 
August of 1948 instituted an action in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court against appellant Lionel Fairbanks, claiming 
violation of the contract, plaintiff's Exhibit "A." The words 
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of the complaint, eliminating the form~l ·parts, are as fol-
lows: 
"Comes now the plaintiff and for cause of action 
against defendant alleges: · 
1. That the plaintiff now is and at all of the times 
hereinafter mentioned has been a corporation duly or-
ganized under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Utah, with its principal place of business at Provo, 
Utah. 
2. That the defendant Lionel Fairbanks now is . 
and at all of the times herein mentioned has been a 
resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and now is 
doing business in Utah County as the Lionel Fairbanks 
Mortuary. 
3. That prior to the 6th day of August, 1945, 
defendant was operating and conducting a mortuary 
and funeral business in Juab and Utah Counties, with 
his principal place of business at Eureka, Utah. That 
on or about the said 6th day of August, 1945, plaintiff 
and defendant entered into an oral agreement whereby 
the plaintiff promised and agreed to pay defendant the 
sum of Five Thousand and Five Hundred Dollars 
($5,500), for and in consideration of the defendant 
agreeing to perform certain conditions on his part, the 
terms of which were to be incorporated into a written 
agreement, which written agreement was made and en-
tered into on the said 6th day of August, 1945, a copy . 
of which agreement follows:" 
(Thereafter there is set out the contract (plaintiff's Ex- · · 
h~bit '.'A") , except paragraph 5 of the contract as shown in 
the complaint was quoted somewhat incorrectly as follows:) 
'5. That the said sellar will not for a period of 
.. _ (25)) twenty five years, froin the date of this contract, 
-operate a mortuary or funeral business in Provo, Utah 
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and in Utah County south of Provo, or Juab County, 
in his O\vn name or through a subsidiary or third par-
ty.' 
4. That in consideration of the foregoing writ-
ten promises made by defendant and in reliance there-
on, plaintiff paid the defendant the sum of Five Thou-
sand and Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500). 
5. That the defendant performed the conditions 
of the agreement as above set forth except that de .. 
fendant, shortly after the signing of said agreement 
and the payment to him by plaintiff of the sum of Five 
Thousand and Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500), began 
operating a mortuary and funeral business in Provo 
and in the area south of Provo in .Utah County and in 
Juab County in his own name, in that he solicits and 
procures customers in those places and holds funerals 
there. 
6. That by reason of the breach of said contract 
by defendant and the operatian of a mortuary and fun-
eral business in Provo and in Utah County south of 
Provo and in Juab Cotinty, plaintiff's business has been 
therPby lessened and damaged to plaintiff's injury in 
the sum of Twenty Thousand ($20,000) _Dollars. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment: 
1. That the Court issue a permanent injunction 
and restraining order enjoining the defendant and his 
agents and assigns from operating or conducting a 
mortuary or funeral business in Juab County and in 
Provo City and in that of Utah County south of Pro-
vo City until August 6th, 1970. 
2. For the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20)000) damages. 
_3. For the costs of this suit and such other and 
further relief as to the Court may seem equitable and 
just." 
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:qefe.nd~nt d~murred to .. ~~e .complai!1t. on the ground 
t~a.t the tompiaJJ:i~ dia riot state facts sUfficient, to .consti-
tute a caus.e·o_( action against the ·d~ffendant .. The.l?emur-
r~r:.was overruled. Thereupon the defendant filed his Ans-
wer which, eliminating the formal parts, is as follows: 
~'Comes now the defendant in the. above entitled 
. action,- and without waiving the Demurrer heretofore 
·filed h~rein, by way of Answer, to the. complaint of the 
pl~inti~r,' admits, denies,, and alleges as· follows: 
·1. Replying. to Paragraph 1 of ·plaintiff's Com-
_plaint, defendant admits the same. · 
~ 
· 2.· Replying to paragraph 2 of plaintiff's Com-
plaint, defendant admits the same. 
. ' 3~ Replying to paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Com-
. 'pla.int, defendant admits the same, excepting that de-
. : fert:dant. alleges that paragraph No .. 5 of said alleged 
. wtitten agreement read and reads as follows: 
. 'That the said seller will not for a period of (25) 
twenty five years; from the date of this contract, oper-
ate a mortuary or funeral business in Utah County, 
··Provo and South or in Juab Counties, in his own name 
· : .:or ·through a subsidiary or ·third party.' 
........ In. addition thereto, the said agreement had at-
_:,· · tiiched, :·and: has attached, an in veri tory of the property 
sold, other than the mortuary building and lot itself. 
.. 4. Answering paragraph 4, defendant admits that 
, ··;the .. plai.ntiff corporation· paid $5.,500.00, pursuant to 
~~.,· tb~ .terms {)f the .. &greement; .. but not. havipg infOl1lUl-
_- ··:·tlcui.With which to form a belief as to the truth or.fal-
c~·::·~·&ity. 'of ,the. ·~lleg9:tio'n contained. in the balance of said 
:: :;.·~:P~ra~rapp;~ · the . def~ndan.t denies the ~arne. 
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5. Answering paragraph 5, the defendant admits 
that he performed on his part the conditions of the 
agreement, set forth therein; but denies the allega-
tion in said paragraph to the effect that defendant, 
after the signing of the agreement and the payment 
of the $5,500.00, began operating a mortuary or fun-
eral business in Provo, Utah and in Uitah County, South 
of Provo and in Juab County; but alleges as an affir-
mative matter that he began operating a mortuary 
and funeral business in Orem, Utah, located approxi-
nlately five (5) miles north of Provo, and that he has 
an investment of approximately $75,000.00 in such 
business. Defendant admits that he has served pat-
rons who have resided in Provo and in parts of Utah 
County, south of Provo and in parts of Juab County, 
and has performed isolated services in connection with 
funerals held therein; but denies the balance of said 
paragraph, and denies specifically that he has at any 
time since said agreement was entered into operated 
a mortuary andjor funeral business in Provo or in 
the area south of Provo o:r in Juab County. 
6. Answering paragraph 6, th~ defendant denies 
the same and the whole thereof. 
7. Defendant denies each and every other mate-
rial allegation contained in plaintiff's complaint, not 
heretofore admitted, modified or denied. 
By way of further defense and as an affirmative 
matter, defendant alleges as follows: 
(a) That Aura C. Hatch, president of the plain· 
tiff corporation, at about the time referred to in plain-
tiff's complaint, prepared the alleged agreement and 
signed the same on behalf of said corporation, and at 
the time of its preparation and execution it was the 
understanding and intent of the defendant and plain-
tiff and its officers and agents and president that the 
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:said . agreement should ~nd· did _,provide . that.· the de-
fendant. should. not maintain· a· building ~r other:physi-
cal es~bl.ish]Jlent for a mortuary b~siness. in Provo, 
.... Utah. in Utah County South of Provo, or in·Juab Coun-
. ty; but defendant ·alleges· that it was not at that titne 
or at any time, the intent of the parties or tl:leir under-
standing, and that the agreement does not provide that 
the defendant .could not condu~t funerals within .said 
territory or. serve patrons therein residing, or accept, 
.. solicjt, or perform services therein. 
·(b) Defendant further alleges that the tangible 
property··conveyed pursuant to the terms of the agree-
. ment, consisting of the mortuary building and lot and 
.. · the .funeral equipment, including the hearse, was, at the 
·. time it was conveyed, of a reasonable and fair value of 
at least $5,500.00; and that to require the defendant 
not 'to·: accept business in Provo; and in Utah County, 
· South or' Provo or in Juab County, would not be fair 
.. ·and would be arbitrary and unconscionable and not 
within the terms of the alleged agreement. · 
(c) . Defend~nt further alleges that to require 
=· · -the defendant to refuse business in or from Provo, and 
in :Utah County South of Provo and in Juab County, 
. , .. w9~ld be arbit~ary and unfair an<;]. in unreasonable re-
" ,_ :straint of trade and injurious to the public welfare. 
·wHEREFORE defendant prays that the Com-
... plaint of the plaintiff be dismissed." 
~ . The plaintiff demurred to the defendant's Answer and 
f <bsequently waived his Demurrer. · ·The plaintiff also filed 
~ ·\.fotio·n to Strike ana a Motion for Judgrrient on the plead-
ir/is. Th·e. Motion for Judgmel)t .. on the pleadings was de-
n~:~d1_.· ·.anq· the. : J(laiJ1tiff . ~ubseq~~ntly · waived his· Motion to 
s~rjk~~-- .. 
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Defendant duly and timely demanded that the matter 
be tried by a jury (Tr. 3-7). The right to jury trial was 
by the court denied and the matter was heard before the 
court over the objection of the defendant (Tr. 3-7). The 
court, in making this ruling, stated as follows: 
THE COURT: "The Court, of course, indicated 
its conception of the law respecting the significance of 
the prayer of the complaint to be as supported by the 
authority tnat Judge Young cited, that it isn't part 
of the allegation, but it may be looted to to determine 
the nature of the relief sought.. There is an allegation 
of acts which the plaintiff contends are being carried 
on at the present time, which the plaintiff contends 
are in violation of the contract, and there is an impli-
cation of it being on occasions of more than one, at any 
rate: Solicits, and procures, customers in those places 
and holds funerals therein. The reasonable interpre-
tation being that there be numerous, at least exceed-
ing one such act. 
The Court conceives in light of the prayer for the 
relief the paramount object of the proceeding is injunc-
tive, that there is an allegation of violation which pres-
ently continues, and where that's supported -by the ref-
erence to the answer of the defendant, claiming a right 
to that, because to enforce the plaintiff's interpretation 
of the contract would result in unlawful restraint of 
trade; that in view of such matter, the question is pri-
marily equitable, that the damage action or the dam-
age claimed in this respect, to the matter, is incidental 
to the primary relief; it being primarily equitable in thr-
Court's mind, the parties are not entitled as a right_ tt 
a jury to try the cause. And in as much as no jury'i 
presently in attendance and this is the day set and .iz 
appearing, at any rate, that very likely if the _questioJ 
had been raised prior to this date, the Court may hav- · 
refused the application for a jury, it is now ordere 1 
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that the .application be. rejected and that the clerk 
return to the defendant the fee heretofore paid for the 
jury. 
You will want to make your exception to that? 
MR. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON: "Yes. If the 
Court please, the ruling is not based upon the fact that 
a jury was not timely demanded, as I understand?~. The 
record shows that?" 
· THE COURT: ·"No, I make no point of that. Mrs. 
~arter was checking that and I understood that the 
fee was paid. I think the record may show that the 
. fee was paid in advance of the setting date and in con- · 
formance with the rule of the court, which places the 
question entirely upon the discretion of the Court and 
its interpretation of the cause as an equitable action 
primarily, so that the record is clear.'' 
MR. -SHERMAN CHRISTENSON: ''Then the de-
. fendant excepts to the ruling of the Court denying the 
defendant's right to a trial by jury pursuant to his de-
. mand; and' also excepts to the holding that this is pri-
marily an equitable action and not- primarily a law ac-
tion; and that no jury is obtainable as a matter of 
· right. And further excepts to the ruling of the Court 
denying the request for--a jury setting." (Tr. 6, 7, 8). 
The matter was thereafter heard before the Court 
which 1n its· F'il1dings of Fact assumed to determine that 
. . - . 
p~ainti~f· had been damaged in the amount of Seven Hund-
re,~ Fifty and N·OjlOO ($750.00) Dollars by defendant for 
breach of. the. contract, and found . with respect to certain 
funerals held by the defendant in Provo, and in Utah Coun-
ty south of Proyo and ~n Juab County, that there had been 
a::- violB.tion~ .. ~The ·Court, of course, found that the contract 
·. . . ·, -.. '·.. ' .. 
ha.d been .exeGq.ted between the parties. 
•, • ' .•·, I r', ' 
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The Conclusions of 4\w herein are very interesting, 
and, eliminating the formal parts, are as follows: 
"1. That on the 6th day of August, 1945, plaintiff 
and defendant entered into a contract whereby the de-
fendant agreed, for a valuable consideration paid to 
him by plaintiff, that he would not, for a period of 
twenty-five years from that date, operate a mortuary 
or funeral business in Utah County or Juab County; 
that said contract was not and is not in restraint of 
trade and its terms are definite and certain. 
2. That the contract dated August 6, 1945, was 
later modified so as to exclude the area north of Provo 
in Utah County from its terms. 
3. That the defendant, in going to P~ovo and 
there obtaining and accepting the dead bodies of those 
who at the time of their deaths were residents of the 
area north of Provo in Utah County and thereafter 
transporting said bodies into Provo and into Utah 
County south of Provo and into Juab County for fun-
eral services and burial did not violate the terms of 
the contract mentioned in paragraph "1" hereof. 
4. That defendant, in going to Provo and into 
the area south of Provo in Utah County and into Juab 
County and there receiving and accepting the bodies 
of deceased who at the time of their death were either· 
residents of Provo or of the area south of Provo in 
Utah County or of Juab -County, violated the terms of 
the contract in that in so doing he engaged in the fun-
eral business in said area. 
5. That defendant, in conducting funeral services 
and burials in Provo and in Utah County south of Pro-
vo and in Juab County, when he had not prepared those 
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bodies· .for burial violated the terms of the ·contract in 
that in so doing he engaged in the funeral business in 
&aid area. 
6, That plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of this 
Court in the sum of $750.00 damages and for its costs 
herein expended.'' 
After making and entering his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of·Law, the Court, eliminating the formal parts, 
decreed as follows: 
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
the defendant, Lionel Fairbanks, his attorneys, agents, 
servants and employees, is and are hereby restrained 
and enjoined until August 6, 1970, from engaging in or 
performing any of the following business or functions 
within the area of Provo City and in Utah County south 
of Provo City and in Juab County, to-wit: 
1. From operating a mortuary therein. 
2~ From accepting or receiving any body for 
preparation and burial in cases where, at the time of 
death, the deceased was a resident of such area . 
. 3. From conducting funerals and burials where 
the body has been prepared for burial at a mortuary 
_not _o\yned and operated by the defendant. 
4. -From advertising that he is conducting a mor-
. tuary establishment or doing a funeral business. 
5. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed 
--that plaintiff _have and recover from said defendant, 
Lionel Fairbanks, the sum of $750.00 as damages to-
gether with its costs herein expended." 
It is from this decree that the plaintiff appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT 
AND APPELLANT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL OF 
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF THE OOURT 
BELOW. 
1. The Court erred in holding that the complaint sta-
ted facts sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to grant 
equitable relief. 
2. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the right 
to have the case tried by a jury. 
3. The Court erred in interpreting the contract to 
mean that the appellant should be prohibited from conduct-
ing funeral services and performing other isolated services 
in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo, and in Juab 
, County. 
4. The Court erred in refusing to receive testimony 
of the value of the mortuary or funeral home operated by 
appellant, Lionel Fairbanks, in Orem, Utah County, Utah. 
5. The Court erred in striking the testimony of the 
appellant,_ Fairbanks, to the effect that Mr. Jex, Treasurer. 
of the Valley Mortuary, after the agreement was entered 
into between the plaintiff corporation and defendant, Fair .. 
banks, came to Orem to approve the loan on behalf of the 
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, in which bank he was 
an officer, and in refusing the proferred testimony with 
respect to Mr. Fairoanks' conversation with Mr. Jex. 
6. The Court erred in rejecting the proferred testi-
mony that the value of the tangible property sold under the 
agreement herein by appellant to respondent was at least 
Fifty Five Hundred and NOjlOO ($5,500) Dollars, the con-
tract price. 
7. The Court erred in making and entering its Find-
ing of Fact No. 3. 
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8. The Court .erred in making and entering its Con-
clusion of Law No. 1. 
9. The Court erred in making and entering its Con-
clusion of Law No. 3. 
10. The Court erred in making and entering its Con-
clusion of Law No. 4. 
11. The Court erred in making and entering its Con-
clusion of Law No. 5.-
12. The Court erred in making and entering its Con-
clusion of La_w No. 6. 
13. The Court erred in decreeing that the defendant 
should be enjoined from accepting or receiving any body 
for preparation or burial in cases where at the time of 
death, the deceased was a resident of Provo City or of Utah 
County south of Provo, or in Juab County. 
14. The Court erred in decreeing that the defendant 
should be enjoined and restrained from conducting burials 
in Provo City or Utah County south of Provo, or in Juab 
County, where the body was prepared for burial at a mor-
tuary not owned and operated by the defendant. 
15. The Court erred in decreeing that the defendant 
should be enjoined from advertising in Provo, or in Utah 
County south of Provo or in Juab County, that he is con-
ducting a mortuary establishment or doing a funeral busi-
ness. 
16. The Court erred- in ordering, adjudging and de-
creeing that the plaintiff_ recover judgment against the de-
fendant in the sum of $750.00, together with his costs ex-
pended. 
17. The Court erred in djsregarding the testimony of 
witnesses of the defendant that they would not have given 
. . .. 
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their ftmeral work to the Valley Mortuary even though the 
services of the appellant Fairbanks were not available. 
18. The Court erred in interpreting the contract to 
mean that the defendant had sold to the plaintiff corpora-
tion under the agreeement, his good will in addition to the 
other property sold under the terms thereof. 
STATElVIENT AND ARGUMENT UPON PARTICULAR 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR DETERMINATION. 
1. The Court erred in holding that the Complaint sta-
ted facts sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to grant 
equitable relief. 
The only allegation in the Complaint which plaintiff 
claims might be a basis for equitable relief is quoted from 
paragraph 5 as follows: , 
"That the defendant performed the conditions of 
the agreement as above set forth except that defendant, 
shortly after the signing of said agreement and the 
payment to him by plaintiff of the sum of Five Thou-
sand and Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500), began oper-
ating a mortuary and funeral business in Provo and in 
the area south of Provo in Utah ·County and in Juab 
County in his own name, in that he solicits and pro-
cures customers in those places and holds funerals 
there." 
Paragraph 6 of the Complaint is quoted as follows: 
"That by reason of the breach of said contract by 
defendant and the operation of a mortuary and funeral 
business in Provo and in Utah County south of Provo 
and in Juab County, plaintiff's business has been there-
by lessened and damaged to plaintiff's injury in the 
sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars." (J. R. 3). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Then follows the prayer for an injunction and dam-
ages. 
The Court held, over the objection of the defendant, 
that the question was primarily equitable and that he 
should hear the matter without a jury and determine the 
whole cause, including the matter of an injunction and the 
question of damages. (Tr. pp. 6, 7, 8). 
Justice Folland of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah, in the case of Wasatch Oil Refining Company vs. 
Wade, 92 Utah 50, 63 Pac. 2d 1070, on page 1078, quoted 
from 10 R. C. L. 372, what he stated was the rule, as fol-
lows: 
"While it is true that a court of equity, having 
once obtained jurisdiction of a cause, will retain it for 
all purposes and administer complete relief, it is gen-
erally conceded, despite the existence of a few oppos--
ing decisions; which may be characterized merely as 
variants from the general rule, that in order to author-
ize relief which can be obtained in a suit at law there 
must be some substantial ground of equitable jurisdic-
tion, and if there is no equitable ground of jurisdiction 
and the remedy sought can be as well obtained in an. 
action at law, a court of equity cannot retain jurisdic-
. tion and grant· a purely legal remedy. Mere state.J 
ments in a bill on which the chancery jurisdiction might 
be maintained, but which are not proved, will not suf-
fice to authorize a decree on such parts of the bill as, 
if standing alone ,would not give the court jurisdic-
tion, but to justify the retention of a cause not only 
must some special and substantial ground of equitable 
jurisdiction b~ alleged, but it must also be proved on 
the hearing.'' . (Boldface type ours) . 
See also: Wyoming Coal Sales Co. v. Smith-Pocahon-
tas Coal Co., 105 W. Va. 610; 144 S. E. 410; 62 A. L. R 740; 
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Norback vs. Board of Directors, etc., 84 Utah 514, 37 Pac. 
2d 339; Goldthait vs. Lynch, et al, 9 Utah 186, 33 Pac. 699; 
State ex rei, Hansen, et al vs. Hart, 26 U. 186, 72 Pac. 938; 
Estay vs. Holdren, District Judge (Kans.), 267 Pac. 1098. 
In a full examination of the complaint and all of the 
pleadings, it is respectfully submitted that. there is no basis 
for equitable cognizance. The plain statement in the pres-
ent tense by plaintiff that shortly after the signing of the 
agreement the defendant began operating a mortuary and 
funeral business in Provo and in Utah County south of Pro-
vo and in Juab County in his own name, in that he_ solicit$ 
and procures customers in those places and holds funerals, 
certainly is a statement of no fact showing a basis for equi-
table relief. From the whole complaint it would appear 
that the action was primarily legal for damages. There is 
no allegation to invoke equitable jurisdiction. There is no 
statement of facts showing that the remedy at law was in-
edequate, nor was there any other statement of any other 
fact to show that the action was primarily equitable. Such 
facts should be stated. There is no showing in the com-
plaint that the building and equipment in Eureka was ever 
even retained by the plaintiff and that there was ever any 
necessity for an injunction-nothing to show that the legal 
remedy of damages was not adequate. For· th~: court to 
tak~ equitable jurisdiction and decide the· case without a 
jury, sufficient facts must be stated in the complaint to 
justify the same. In fact, the plaintiff alleged specific dam .. 
ages covering all the claimed wrongful acts of the defend .. 
ant, and there can be no other conclusion from the body 
of the complaint but that those damages would. furnish it 
full relief. 
We submit that the issues based upon the complaint 
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are primarily, and, indeed, solely legal. Vol. 3 of Bancroft 
on Code Pleadings, page 2551, paragraph 1545, states: 
"The Complaint must state all the facts essential 
to a cause of action for equitable relief and more par-
ticularly the facts justifying an injunction. What must 
be alleged in a particular case, of course, depends large-
ly upon what is essential in a right of action in that 
sort of case." 
From an examination of the complaint, we certainly 
cannot see how the Court could determine that the action 
was primarily equitable and that there were sufficient facts 
alleged upon which to base an injunction. 
2. The Court erred in refusing the defendant the 
right to have a trial by jury. 
If the District Court were correct in holding that the 
issues raised by the· complaint and answer established pri-
marily an equitable action, then and only then under the 
law had he the right to deny the defendant a jury trial. 
The Court did deny such right to the defendant and based 
its denial upon his holding that the action, based on plain-
tiff's complaint, was primarily equitable (Tr. 6, 7 & 8). 
Justice Moffitt, speaking for the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Norback vs. Board of Directors of Church 
Extension Society, 84 Utah 514, 37 Pac. 2d 339, at page 
343, said: 
"Where the issues are legal issues, the fact that 
equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry into effect 
the judgments based upon the legal issues, is not suf · 
ficient to deprive either party of his right to have the 
legal issu~ submitted to a jury." 
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The same view is held .in the case of Morthner vs. 
Laynes, (Calif.) 168· Pac. 2d 481; Petty vs. Clark, 102 Utah 
186, 129 Pac. 2d 568. See also: State ex rei Hansen vs. 
Hart, 26 Utah 229, 72 Pac. 938. In this case the only basis 
for equitable relief is the prayer, and the prayer is not part 
of the complaint. The whole basis for the relief in the com-
plaint is legal. It follows that the Court herein wrongfully· 
denied the defendant the right to a trial by jury, and the 
case should be remanded. 
3. The Court erred in the interpretation of the con-
tract. 
The Court held that the contract (plaintiff's Exhibit 
"A") was definite and certain, and that it meant that the 
defendant had agreed not to conduct 'funerals and engage 
in· other miscellaneous activities in Provo, Utah, and in 
Utah County south of Provo and in Juab Count~. As may . 
be seen by the Conclusions of Law quoted above, arid iii 
Judgment Roll, page ·43, the Court concluded that the resi-
dence of a decedent governed as to· whether. or not the de- . 
fendant could perform funerals in Provo and in the other 
parts of the territory in question. The decree supported 
the conclusions in ·this particular respect. ( J. R. 44~45) . 
It is interesting to· note in examining the~ transcript of .. 
record \Vith respect to· the occasion when counsel for plain~ 
tiff was examining the defendant with respect to funerals 
that had been 'held ·by defendant, as to the questions·that 
\Vere asked~ In the case of the death of Lawrence Russell 
Gren, a re~ident of ·Orem; who died in Utah Valley Hb~pital 
in Provo, with funeral in Orem and burial in Provo,_.coun-
sel apparently claimed a violation · (Tr 27 -28) 0: The same 
was the case of Susan Virginia Stokes, resident of Orem, 
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who died in the Utah Vally Hospital with funeral in Provo 
(Tr. 28). The same was the case in connection with the 
death of Lewis Wahlquist, a resident of Orem, who died in 
Utah Valley Hospital in Provo, and who was buried in Eu-
reka (Tr. 28-29). 
Counsel apparently claimed no violation with respect 
to the death of Arthur Lynn Boswell, a resident of Vine-
yard (near Provo) who died in Utah Valley Hospital, with 
funeral held in Provo (Tr. 29-30). 
Counsel for plaintiff apparently claimed a violation 
with respect to Anna W. Maag, a resident of Orem who died 
in Payson Hospital, with funeral in Orem and Burial in Pro-
vo (Tr. 40). 
Counsel also apparently claimed violation with respect 
to Thomas Fielding, a resident of Orem, who died in uttah 
County Infirmary with burial in Orem and funeral in Orem 
(Tr. 40). 
The same was apparently the case with respect to the 
death of Alice Diane Carter, a resident of Orem, who died 
in Utah Valley Hospital at Provo, with funeral in Orem and 
burial in Heber, Utah (Tr. 41, 42). 
As an anomaly herein, counsel apparently felt there 
was no violation in the case of Arthur Gilbert, Jr., a resi-
dent of Provo, who died in Salt Lake City, the funeral ser-
vices conducted in Provo and burial in Murray, Salt Lake 
County, Utah (Tr. 42). 
Counsel apparently claimed a violation with respect 
to the death of Charles Terry, a resident of Orem, who died 
in the Utah Valley Hospital in Provo, the funeral services 
in Orem and burial in Provo (Tr. 42-43) ~ 
Counsel also apparently claimed a violation with re· 
spect to Lena Smith, a resident of Los Angeles, California, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23·:· 
who died· at Uos Angeles; \vith funeraf in··Ettreka and ·burial· 
in Springville, Utah (Tr. 43). · 
Counsel· also apparently claimed a violation with· . re-
spect to La\vrence Russell--Rand, a resident of Orerh, who· 
died in Provo and was buried in Orem (Tr. 46). 
Counsel for plaintiff apparently claimed violation with 
respect to Janice Sanstrom, a- resident of Provo, who died 
in Orem and was buried in Provo (Tr. 50). 
Counsel for plaintiff apparently claimed violation with 
respect to Tim Allred, a resident- of Orem, who 9-ied ·'in Pro-
vo with burial in Orem .. 
Col.msel apparently claimed no violation as to a per-
son who died in France and was buried in Santaquin (Tr. 
54) , and others where the body was not prepared· for burial 
by the defendant (Tr. 54-55). 
Of course, in a statement to the Court; . coufisel ad~ -
mitted that he may have been somewhat inconsistent in his 
questions in this respect, but stated that was· because of his 
desire not to be unfair to the defendant (Tr. 206). 
. . 
The above is shown in detail to ex~mplify the rather 
strained and far-fetched interpretation the Court gave __ the 
contract in question. He apparently interpreted it that' the 
defendant should not conduct funerals in Provo and in Utah .... 
County south of Provo and in Juab County; but then ~olds ·_ 
that the contract meant that if people wer~ residents- or .-
places -north of· Provo, ·it- was all right to ·conduct" funerals 
t~erein; to pick up bodies therein, and to supervise the buri-
al·therein. If the Coirrt is right that the contract did nof--
mean -that the defendant -should only n·ot operate a physi-:· · 
cal-establishment at Provo -or in ·utah CoLmty south· of·: .. 
Provo and in. Juab County, ·then -we -submit' he ·>would be 
wrong in saying that defendant was· not- 'in violation ··~wherf:'< 
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he conducted funerals in Provo and Utah County south of 
Provo or in Juab County, even though the decedents were, 
at the time of their deaths, residents of places north of Pro-
vo. The distinction is artificially drawn. Of course, the 
Court attempts to avoid this rather anomalous situation by 
saying in his memorandum decision that it would be un-
thinkable to hold that the defendant could not conduct 
these funerals in the disputed area. It is unthinkable, in 
our opinion, for the Court to jnterpret the contract arti .. 
ficially and in such a strained way as he has, when the con-
tract, interpreted in the way we maintain is correct, would 
be clear and unequivocal. The Court held the contract to 
be clear and unequivocal; the only way it could be unequivo,. 
cal would be to hold that it meant that the defendant would 
not operate a physical establishment in Provo or in Utah 
County south of Provo or in Juab County. Indeed,. it would 
appear to be all the protection the plaintiff would need to 
protect its business building in Eureka. 
Let us consider the words about which the controversy 
mainly has arisen. We quote again from paragraph 5 of 
the contract (plaintiff' Exhibit ·"A") as follows: 
"That the seller will not for a period of twenty five 
25 years from the date of this contract, operate a mor-
tuary or funeral business in Utah County, Provo and 
South of Provo or in Juab Counties in his own name 
or through a subsidiary or third party." 
The New Century Dictionary, Volume 2, published by 
Collier, gives the two main defihitions of operate other than 
the manual act upon the body of a patient, they define it 
as follows: 
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"to be working, aet .effectively·, or exert force or.:. 
_ ~flue~ce_ (as,-_ the same causes are operating today; . 
a new spirit was operating among them.; etc)." 
-It also gives the definition: 
" to bring about, effect, or produce, and by ac-
tion or the exertion of force or influence; also, to keep 
(a machine, apparatus, factory, industrial system; etc.) 
working or in operation; manage or use -(a machine, 
etc.) at work.'' 
In discussing the definition of the word operate· there 
are several interesting cases in the publication- \Vords and-
Phrases, among which is the case of State vs. Mahforez, · 
181 -Louisiana 183, 158 Southern.609. In that case it was 
held that the word operate means _ 
"to bring about; to put into or continue an opera-_ 
tion or activity; to manage, to conduct; tq carry out or 
through; to work, as to .. operate a machine/' -~ · · ·;•_ -· · 
In the case Kornhauser vs. National Surety Co.; li4- ,_ 
Ohio St. 24, 150 N. E. 921-923, it was stated that in re-
lation to the operation of a coal' bed, the word operate is . _ 
synonymous with occupy or- work. In discussing the case . . 
the judgment says:-
"occupy is also held to be synonynious . with vvork . 
or operate, in_ the primary and most familiar ·sense· of · · 
the word, occupy is the equivalent of the- word possess. -
It implies the_ conception of permanent· tenure- for a ' 
period of greater or less duration as ll:Sed in •- a· deed. 
· In relation· to the operation of a coal bed, the word 
occupy is. synonymous with the word work or _ope~~·" 
.: ·The word mortuary is defined-as a "dead house,'".and···._.-. 
the· Court has· determined there is no· question- about the ' -
operation of a mortuary. 
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Business, in the same dictionary, is defined as follows: 
~'The state of being busy; also, that with which 
one is busy or occupied; a matter of special concern at 
a particular time; a particular mission; charge, pur-
pose, etc.; something to be done or attended to; an af-
fair in which one has the right to act or interfere, or 
the right itself; any matter, affair, or thing as (This 
is bad business; tired of the whole business) ; also a 
matter of habitual concern or interest; one's occupa-
tion, profession, or trade; also, action which requires 
time, attention and labor; serious employment as op-
posed to intercourse generally; esp., commercial deal-
ings, mercantile pursuits collectively; trade, commer-
cial transactions or engagements;· also, a commercial 
enterprise or establishment." 
The word funeral is defined as follows: 
"Of or pertaining to the ceremonial burial (or, 
sometimes, cremation) of the dead; used, spoken, etc., 
on such an occasion (as, funeral rites, a funeral ser-
mon). The ceremonies connected with the disposition 
of the body of a dead person; obsequies; also, a funeral 
procession." 
The Court will undoubtedly take judicial notice of the 
fact that no one is exclusively in the business of conducting 
funerals only. They als~ will take judicial notice of the 
fact that mortuaries are very often known as funeral 
homes. 
We submit that the contract either refers to operating 
a mortuary or funeral business as a physical establishment 
or plant or it is ambiguous. 
If it refers to the establishment itself, therein lies the 
solution of this case. That is what defendant claims, but if 
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it means to do any funeral business in the sense of the- pick-
ing up of bodies, receiving calls, etc., that is another thing. 
It is not enough to say that. the contract definitely includes 
some of the acts claimed by the plaintiff; the whole mean-
ing is the thing in doubt. Does it mean receiving telephone 
calls, taking the hearse to Eureka, responding to requests 
of residents of Orem to go to ?rovo, taking a body from 
out of the City of Provo? It is not enough to say that 
there is no violation where the decedent is a resident of 
Orem even though the death and burial is in Provo. ·That 
is an artificial, strained construction by the Court. 
There was an interesting Washington case recently . be-
tween Merlin et ux., vs. Rodine et ux, 203 Pac. 2d 683. 
Here the Supreme Court held that a contract was not am-
biguous, but in the course of its opinion states: 
"We have consistently held that we cannot, upon 
general principles of abstract justice, make a contract 
for the parties that they did not make for themselves." 
Here there would not even be principles of· abstract 
justice in the contract the Court is attempting to make for 
the parties. 
We subm~t that the only way the contract could, be . 
unambiguous is to hold that the contract meant and : 
means that the defendant would not operate a _physical. es-
tablishment in Provo or in Utah County south of Provo 
or Juab County, either in the nature of a ·mortuary itself 
or a funeral business in connection with his home. Cer~ -
tainly one would not call his home from which 'he might . 
conduct his funeral business a mortuary. It is. certainly 
unclear and equivocal that the contract meant only as the 
Court found. 
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To aid in the interpretation of this particular contract, 
we would like to quote from 12 Am. Jr. 791, paragraph 
250, which reads as follows: 
"Agreements must receive a reasonable interpre-
tation, according to the intention of the parties at the 
time of executing them, if that intention can be ascer-
tained from their language. In the transactions of 
business life, sanity of end and aim is at least a pre-· 
sumption, though a rebuttable one. A reasonable in-
terpretation will be preferred to one which is unreason-
able. When the evidence of the agreement furnished 
by the contract itself is not plain and unmistakable, 
but is open to more than one interpretation, the reason .. 
ableness of one meaning as compared with the other 
and the probability that men in the circumstances of 
the parties would enter into one agreement or the oth-
er are competent for consideration on the question as 
to what the agreement was which the written contract 
establishes. When the language of an agreement is 
contradictory, obscure, or ambiguous, or where its 
meaning is doubtful, so that it is susceptible of two 
constructions, one of which makes it fair, customary, 
and such as prudent men would naturally execute, 
while the other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such 
as reasonable men would not be likely to enter into, the 
interpretation which makes a rational and probable 
agreement must be preferred. The interpretation of 
any instrument ought to be broad enough to allow 
it to operate fairly and justly under all the conditions 
to which it may apply. A court will not place an un-
just interpretation upon a contract, unless the terms 
thereof compel it to do so. An agreement will not be 
interpreted so as to render it oppressive or inequitable 
as to either party or so as to place one of the parties 
at the mercy of the other, unless it is clear that such 
was their intention at the time the agreement was 
made. An interpretation which is just to both parties 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29· 
will be preferred to one which· is unjust. Every in-
tendment is to be made against the interpretation of 
a contract under which it would operate. as a snare. 
The inconvenience, hardship, or absurdity of one in-
terpretation of a contract or its contradiction of the 
general purpose of the contract is weighty evidence 
that such meaning was not intended when the langUage 
is open to an interpretation which is neither absurd nor 
frivolous and is in agreement with the general purpose 
of the parties." 
It does not seem that under the reasonable facts and 
the reasonable circumstances of this case that the plaintiff 
should be entitled to force the defendant to do . any 
more than not maintain a physical establishment closer 
than 57 miles from the mortuary building sold by defend-
ant to plaintiff in order to protect the plaintiff. 
The Court admitted testimony of Aura ·C. Hatch, presi-
dent and manager of the plaintiff mortuary, that he pre-
pared the contract in question (Tr. 192). It should have 
been construed most adversely against the plaintiff instead 
of most favorably to it, as its officer made the contract. 
General Mills, Inc., vs. Cragun, et al, 102 Utah 239, 134 
Pac. 2d 1089. 
In this case part of the transcript of the deposition of 
Aura C. Hatch, president of the plaintiff mortuary, which 
deposition was taken January 28, 1949, was offered in evi-. 
den~e for the purpose of showing what Hatch, when he 
drew the contract, undoubtedly meant by operating a busi-
ness. Hatch, in answer to the following questions, made 
the following answers: 
"Q. Where do you live, Mr. Hiatch? · 
A. 85 East 3rd South. 
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Q. What is your business? 
A. I am a mortician, president and general manager 
of the Valley Mortuary. 
Q. And is that a corporation, Mr. Hatch? 
A. Corporation. 
Q. Who are the other officers in the corporation? 
A. LeRoy Johnson. 
Q. What is his position? 
A. He is the treasurer, William R. Jex, Secretary. 
Walter M. Rigby, Vice President. 
Q. Where does Mr. Johnson reside? 
A. Here in Provo. 
Q. Is he also a director? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And where· does Mr. Jex reside? 
A. At Spanish Fork. 
Q. Mr. Rigby? 
A. Payson. 
Q. How long have you been incorporated, Mr. Hatch? 
A. Since 1943. 
Q. And have you had the same officers during that 
time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you have your business here in Provo? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you operate at any other place? 
A. Yes, we operate at Payson, and Eureka we have 
a place." (Tr. 193-194). (Boldface ours). 
The Court, we believe, erroneously sustained the ob-
jection to the admission of the testimony from the tran-
script of the deposition. 
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It would be strange to say, would it not, that because 
we;- as counsel, take a case down in Sanpete County that 
we are operating our law business in Sanpete County, even 
though the physical· plant of our office is located in Provo, 
Utah. Certainly we are operating our law business in Pro-
vo, Utah, as an establishment or calling. 
The defendant offered to show by the testimony of 
Fairbanks that the tangible property specified in the con-
tract, (plaintiff's Exhibit "A"), including the property in-
ventoried upon the exhibit attached to the contract, was 
of a reasonable money value in excess of Fifty F1ive Hun .. 
dred and NOjlOO ($5,500) Dollars. The Court declined 
the offer. (Tr. 184). In interpretation oft the contract, 
the Court certainly should have accepted the testimony 
that the physical property conveyed itself was of a value 
in excess of Fifty Five Hundred and NO jlOO Dollars. The 
Court erred in refusing that testimony. 
That testimony would not go to vary the terms of a 
written instrument, but would show some of the surround-
ing circumstances, and would go to the reasonableness as 
to whether or not the defendant would have executed such 
a contract with the meaning that the Court has so artifi-
cially interpreted it to have. 
The Court, in interpreting the contract, failed and re-
fused to give any weight to the following testimony of Lio-
nel Fairbanks, which was neither rebutted or denied: 
"Q. Directing your attention to the time the contract 
was changed by interlineation, did you have a conversation 
with Mr. Hatch? 
A. Yes, yes, I did. 
Q. And will you state what was said? 
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A. Well, I went to his home in Provo and told him 
that I had decided to build a mortuary in Orem or Ameri-
can Fork, and that I would like the contract modified per-
mitting me to build a mortuary there. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said, 'Well, I see no reason for you not build-
ing a mortuary in Orem. We don't have any places north 
of Provo.' And we went into some detail about modifying 
it and he said, 'Well, if we put it that you can't build a mor-
tuary south of Provo would that be satisfactory, or Provo 
and South?' And I said, 'That will be fine with me, Mr. 
Hatch.' So he modified the contract. 
Q. By the interlineation appearing in pen?· 
A. Uh huh." 
.Certainly after Hatch, who was negotiating for the 
plaintiff corporation, had a_ conversation with respect to 
where a mortuary might be built, the contract could not 
have meant what the Court interpreted it to mean. 
· Assignments of Error numbered 4, 5, and 6, we be-
lieve, will not require further separate treatment, other 
than to say that the Court should have taken into consid-
eration evidence of the circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing of the contract, testimony with respect to the value of 
defendant's mortuary built in Orem, and testimony with 
respect to the financing thereof after an appraisal by an 
·officer of the Valley lVIortuary, should have been received. 
(Tr. 65). 
The Court should have received testimony with re-
spect to the value of the tangible assets conveyed under 
the contract, such value being in excess of $5,500 (Tr. 80-
89, 110-112). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
This testimony would go to the facts surrounding the 
\ 
making of the contract, and should have been received by 
the Court. 
Assignments of Error numbered 7 to 16 inclusive are 
all based upon whether or not the Court was correct in de-
nying a jury trial to the defendant, and thereafter whether 
or not he was correct in the interpretation of the contract. 
If the Court erred, as we feel he did, in denying a jury trial 
to defendant, and also erred in his interpretation of the con-
tract, as we also feel he did, then there was error as to 
the matters assigned No. 7 to 16 inclusive. 
4. Tlie Court erred in disregarding the testimony of 
witnesses of the defendant as to \V.hether or not they would 
have given funeral work to tbe Valley Mortuary. -
In spite of the direct testimony of the defendant's wit-
nesses that even if the services of Lionel Fairbanks had not 
been a~ailable they would not have given their funeral work 
to The Valley Mortuary, the Court, in all but one instance, 
disregarded it. (Judgment Roll, pages 35-36; Tr. 137-138, 
148-149, 151-152, 155-156, 162, 164). 
~ 
5. The Court erred in. interpreting the contract to in-
clude the sale of good will. 
The contract (plaintiff's Exhibit "A") was prepared 
by Aura C. Hatch, president of the Valley Mortuary (Tr. 
192). He specified matters to be sold under the contract 
and under the inventory. If good vlill were intended to 
pass under the contract, we submit that the writer thereof 
would have specified it. The fact that he failed to state 
that the good will passed, and specified everything else that 
did pass, should be, in our opinion, ample support for the 
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view that good will did not pass. All that the defendant 
agreed·was not to operate a physical establishment, a mor-
tuary or funeral business in Provo and Utah County, south 
of Provo, and in Juab County. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the Court erred in holding that the 
case was primarily equitable, and in denying the defendant 
a trial by jury. We further submit that the Court erred 
in the interpretation of the contract and in refusing the 
admission of testimony as to the facts surrounding the exe-
cution thereof. 
We further submit that the case should be remanded 
and the defendant granted a trial by jury, and, in any 
event, that the contract should be interpreted to only pro-
hibit the defendant from operating a mortuary or funeral 
business in Provo or Utah County south of Provo or in Ju-
ab County as a physical establishment, and that the decree 
and judgment of the District Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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